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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OsCAR H. DOYLE, JR.*
A review of the cases with which we are concerned in the
1958 Survey reveals that the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina has not departed to any great extent from well estab-
lished and settled principles and rules of substantive and
procedural criminal law and evidence. A majority of the
cases dealt with concern the procedural and evidentiary
aspect of criminal law rather than the substantive field.
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
Murder - Inference of Malice From Wanton
Use of Automobile
In State v. Mouzon1 the defendants were indicted for
murder. The testimony disclosed that the defendant Mouzon,
while intoxicated, drove an automobile on the public high-
ways in a reckless and wanton manner, resulting in his
running into and over a pedestrian who was crossing the
highway and causing the death of the pedestrian. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty with recommendation to mercy.
On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the conviction, say-
ing that although it may be fairly assumed there was no ac-
tual intent to kill or injure another, there was evidence of
such recklessness and wantoness as to indicate a depravity
of mind and disregard of human life from which a jury
could infer malice.
The Supreme Court cited State v. Heyward2 wherein it
was stated "that malice as an essential ingredient of murder
does not necessarily import ill-will toward the individual
injured, 'but signifies rather a general malignant recklessess
[sic] toward the lives and safety of others, or a condition
of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty
and fatally bent on mischief."' The Court further cites State
v. Long3 wherein it was held "that the driving of an auto-
*Member of the firm of Doyle & Doyle, Anderson; undergraduate
education, Clemson College; LL.B., 1950, University of South Carolina;
member of State Legislature, 1956-57; Assistant Solicitor, 10th Judicial
Circuit.
1. 231 S. C. 655, 99 S. E. 2d 672 (1957).
2. 197 S. C. 371, 15 S. E. 2d 699 (1941).
3. 186 S. C. 439, 195 S. E. 624 (1938).
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SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
mobile on a public highway, while intoxicated is not only
malum rohibitum, but malum in se, . . . 'and one so doing
and occasioning injuries to another, causing death, may be
guilty of murder or manslaughter, as the facts may de-
termine.'"
This appears to be the only case in which the Supreme
Court of South Carolina has had to deal with a verdict of
murder arising out of the operation of an automobile.
Involuntary Manslaughter - Simple Negligence Sufficient
- Contributory Negligence of Deceased No Defense
In State v. Caldwe l4 defendants were indicted for invol-
untary manslaughter in the operation of an automobile. Tes-
timony disclosed that the actions of the deceased were such
as would ordinarily constitute contributory negligence and
a point raised on appeal was the refusal of the trial judge to
direct a verdict upon the ground that the proximate cause
of the death of the deceased was her own negligence. The
Supreme Court adhered strictly to prior rulings holding that
in prosecution for involuntary manslaughter contributory
negligence of deceased is no defense and that simple negli-
gence on the part of the defendant is sufficient to sustain a
verdict of guilty as to involuntary manslaughter.
The Supreme Court states again that if a change in the
"simple negligence" rule is desired, it should come from the
Legislature.
Receiving Stolen Goods - Merger of Offenses
In State v. Rutledge5 the defendant induced others to steal
property. As to one of the indictments against him, the
property was stolen in North Carolina and the defendant
later received it in South Carolina. He was convicted of
"receiving stolen goods." On appeal, he contended that one
could not be guilty of receiving stolen goods when the goods
were stolen in another state and received in this state and,
further, that he could not be convicted of receiving stolen
goods when he conspired with others to steal the property
which he acquired as a result of the conspiracy. He further
contended that those facts made him a principal in the offense
of larceny and that he could not be convicted of receiving the
same property which he conspired to steal.
4. 231 S. C. 184, 98 S. E. 2d 259 (1957).
5. 232 S. C. 223, 101 S. E. 2d 289 (1957).
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As to the first point, the Court held that it is well settled
in this state that one who steals property in another state
and brings it into this state is subject to prosecution for
larceny here and that "'where one takes goods from another
in any place, under circumstances which make the taking
felonious, the possession of the owner, in contemplation of
law, continues, and where the goods so taken are carried into
another state, that constitutes a new taking and asportation
in that state for which an indictment for larceny will lie.'"
It follows that if an indictment for larceny will lie in the
second state, a conviction for receiving the property knowing
it to have been stolen will stand in the second state.
As to appellant's contention that his conspiracy made him
a principal as to the crime of larceny, the Court stated that
the fact that one enters into a criminal conspiracy with others
to commit a crime does not necessarily make him a principal
in the substantive crime resulting from the conspiracy and
that, furthermore, the crimes of larceny and receiving stolen
goods are two distinct offenses and there could not have
been a merger of the two offenses because a conspiracy to
commit a crime is not merged in the commission of the com-
pleted offense.
Murder - Irresistible Impulse and Insanity
In State v. Allen6 defendant was convicted of manslaughter.
Evidence was offered in his behalf to show that he was in-
sane at the time of the act. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the rule as to the defense of insanity, stating
that the test in this state is the mental capacity or want of
mental capacity sufficient to distinguish moral or legal right
from moral or legal wrong and to recognize the act charged
as morally or legally wrong. It was urged on behalf of
appellant that the "McNaghten rule", the "right and wrong
rule", be abandoned in favor of the "irresistible impulse
rule." The Supreme Court expressly repudiated the "irresis-
tible impulse rule" and firmly adhered to the well established
"McNaghten rule."
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
Confessions
The subject of confessions has been fully and ably treated
in prior editions of the South Carolina Law Quarterly. Dur-
6. 231 S. C. 391, 98 S. E. 2d 826 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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ing the period of this survey, only one case substantially in-
volving the question of confessions appears to have been passed
upon. State v. ClinkscaleS7 was a capital case. The defendant,
a young Negro, made an oral confession to officers while in
custody. The oral confession was later reduced to writing
and introduced into evidence. All the testimony tended to
show the confession was voluntary. The defense offered no
testimony and no objection to the admission of the confession,
nor did defense counsel request a charge as to confessions
and apparently the trial judge did not charge on the law
relating to confessions.
The Supreme Court stated that were the instant case not a
capital one the failure of the trial judge to so charge would
not be considered. However, the case being of a capital na-
ture, the Court commendably gave the defendant every con-
sideration and remanded the case, stating that although all
the evidence may tend to show that a confession made while
under arrest was a voluntary one, the jury may not be so
convinced; and it is the jury who, in the final analysis, must
determine the factual issue of voluntariness and that the jury
should be instructed as to their power to deal with the con-
fession.
Evidence of Previous Difficulty between Defendant
and Deceased
In the Clinkscales cases the Court also held that evidence
of previous difficulties between the parties is admissible, but
that the details of such difficulties are not admissible. (In
this case the defendant shot deceased in the back with a
shotgun six weeks before the act resulting in the death of
deceased).
Evidence - Statements by Co-Defendant In and
Out of Court
The first case treated in this survey was State v. Mouzon.9
Another point raised in that case was that the court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury that the testimony of one
defendant could not be considered against the other. The
Court held that any statement or confession made out of court
by one of the defendants could not be considered against the
7. 231 S. C. 650, 99 S. E. 2d 663 (1957).
8. Ibid.
9. 231 S. C. 655, 99 S. E. 2d 672 (1957).
1958]
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other, but that the testimony in court of one defendant against
his codefendant was admissible and such testimony should
be treated like that of any other witness, with the jury being
the judge of its credibility.
Change of Venue
In the Mouzon case' 0 appellants' counsel moved for a change
of venue upon the ground that a fair and impartial trial
could not be had in Clarendon County in that there was a
strong and aroused public sentiment against defendants. Ap-
pellants introduced affidavits which they contended sup-
ported that position. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that it
was within the discretion of the trial judge to grant or refuse
the motion. The feature of the motion which most concerned
the Supreme Court was the statement of one of appellants'
counsel that he could not obtain the services of any lawyer
at Manning, the county seat of Clarendon County, to assist
in the trial, although his clients were willing and able to
pay a reasonable fee for such services. The Supreme Court
stated that although "the fact that a defendant is unable to
retain local counsel is a striking index of the condition of
public sentiment, . . . it would be going too far that this
necessitates in every case the granting of a motion to change
venue" and that this is especially true in view of the fact
that no showing was made as to why local counsel declined
employment.
Disqualification of Over-Age Juror
It is provided in Article 5, Section 22 of the 1895 Con-
stitntion of the State of South Carolina that "each juror
must be a qualified elector under the provisions of this Con-
stitution between the age of twenty-one and sixty-five years
and of good moral character."
Section 38-203 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina
provides as follows:
All objections to jurors called to try prosecutions, ac-
tions, issues or questions arising out of actions or special
proceedings in the various courts of this state, if not
made before the juror is empaneled for or charged with
the trial of such prosecution, action, issue or question
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deemed waived and if made thereafter shall be of none
effect.
In State v. Rayfield'1 the Court cites State v. Jones12 which
held that it was incumbent upon movant for disqualification
of juror to show "(1) the fact of disqualification, (2) that
it was unknown before verdict and (3) that he was not negli-
gent in making discovery of the disqualification before ver-
dict."
State v. Rayfield also construes the word "objection" con-
tained in section 38-203 of the Code to mean such objections
of which the party had knowledge, or which, by the exercise
of due diligence he could have known.
Impeachment of One's Own Witness
In State v. Trul113 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule
that a party may impeach or cross-examine his own witness
where the witness is hostile or unwilling or who surprises
the party calling him by offering testimony inconsistent or
contradictory with prior statements made to the party calling
him. The Court states that permission to so impeach or
cross-examine is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.
Conduct of Counsel: Conference between Trial Judge
and Solicitor
In State v. Heath"4 it appears that during an embezzle-
ment trial the solicitor had information that the jury would
be contacted by outsiders. The solicitor then conferred with
the trial judge in chambers without the presence of counsel
for the defendant. This was a point raised on appeal.
The Supreme Court held that it was not proper for the
solicitor to confer privately with the trial judge, but since
the conference had no bearing upon the guilt or innocence of
appellant, it was not prejudicial to defendant and the con-
viction was affirmed.
Indictment by Grand Jury without Warrant
In State v. Walker'5 the defendant was indicted for the
crime of statutory rape. Thereafter, his counsel agreed with
11. 232 S. C. 230, 101 S. E. 2d 505 (1958).
12. 90 S. C. 290, 73 S. E. 177 (1912).
13. 232 S. C. 250, 101 S. E. 2d 648 (1958).
14. 232 S. C. 387, 102 S. E. 2d 268 (1958).
15. 232 S. C. 290, 101 S. E. 2d 826 (1958).
1958]
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the solicitor that the charge be reduced to bastardy and pre-
sented to the grand jury. At a subsequent term of court this
was done and the grand jury returned a true bill. Defendant,
in the meantime, had employed different counsel, and motion
was made to quash the indictment upon the ground that no
arrest warrant had been issued by a magistrate for the crime
of bastardy.
The Supreme Court reviewed the Code sections relating
to jurisdiction of magistrates with reference to bastardy
and, concluding that the magistrate's jurisdiction was not
exclusive, but that he could only bind defendant over or place
him under recognizance for support should defendant admit
guilt, held that a grand jury may indict for any crime which
is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of a magistrate or
other inferior court, whether or not there has been a prior
proceeding before a magistrate and an arrest warrant issued.
Separation of Juror - Outside Influence
In State v. Loftis16 the defendant was convicted of assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature. After the case
had been submitted to the jury and while they were deIiberat-
ing, the trial judge instructed the bailiffs to take the jurors
to lunch. One of the jurors separated and went to his home
to have his lunch. Upon learning that one juror was missing,
the bailiffs located him and instructed him to return at once
to the jury room. The only person the juror talked to while
separated was his wife and a son of one of the bailiffs, but
it was established that they did not discuss the case being
tried. The appellant contended on appeal that the separation
of the juror warranted a new trial.
The Supreme Court held that it was within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge upon motion for new trial to de-
termine whether or not the jury had been subjected to out-
side influence and that the mere fact that a jury wrongfully
separates without leave of the court after submission of a
case is not per se sufficient for setting aside a verdict. The
Court also differentiated the instant case from State v. Senn
17
and State v. Campbell.'8 In the Senn case the jury left the
jury room while deliberating and continued deliberation in
16. 232 S. C. 35, 100 S. E. 2d 671 (1957).
17. 32 S. C. 392, 11 S. E. 292 (1890).
18. 144 S. C. 53, 142 S. E. 31 (1920).
[Vol. 11
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the court room while mingling with other persons. In the
Campbell case, a deputy who was definitely interested in the
outcome of the case had lunch with the jury and conversed
with members thereof.
III. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Carelessly or Negligently Burning Lands of Another or
Allowing Fire to Spread to Lands of Another
By Act No. 745, South Carolina General Assembly, 1958,
section 16-318 of the 1952 Code was amended to make it
unlawful to carelessly or negligently set fire to or burn any
combustible matter on any lands so as to cause or allow fire
to spread to the lands of another, or causes same to be done
or aids and assists such to be done and provides that one
so doing shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable
for a first offense by imprisonment for not less than twenty
nor more than thirty days or by fine of not less than twenty-
five dollars nor more than one-hundred dollars. Subsequent
offenses carry a penalty of not less than thirty days nor
more than one year or a fine of not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or both in the
discretion of the court.
Desecration or Mutilation of Flags
Act No. 812, General Assembly of South Carolina, 1958,
amends sections 16-532 and 16-533 of the 1952 Code and
makes it a misdemeanor to (a) knowingly place or cause to
be placed any figure, mark, picture, etc. upon any flag,
standard, color or ensign of the United States, the Confed-
erate States of America, or the State of South Carolina, and,
(b) knowingly display to public view any such flag which
shall have such markings, or (c) manufacture, sell or give
away any such flag with any such markings. Penalty for
violation is set at one hundred dollars fine or imprisonment
for not more than thirty days.
Driving under Influence
Act No. 801, South Carolina General Assembly, 1958,
amends section 46-348 of the 1952 Code so as to provide that
in prosecutions for driving under the influence of intoxicants,
etc. only those violations which occured within the period of
ten years including and immediately preceding the date of
the last violation shall constitute prior violations.
19581
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Unlawful to Park Vehicle on Private Property of Another
Act No. 807, South Carolina General Assembly, 1958, makes
it unlawful to park a vehicle on the private property of an-
other without the owner's consent and provides that the
owner of the property may store the vehicle and charge the
owner storage.
Convicts, Credit for Good Behavior
Act No. 902, South Carolina General Assembly, 1958, pro-
vides that prisoners whose record show good conduct shall
be entitled to a deduction from sentence as follows:
1. Ten days for each month served during the first seven
years of the sentence.
2. Six days for each month served during the remainder of
the sentence.
Domestic Employees, Solicitation for Out-of-State Work
Act No. 915, South Carolina General Assembly, 1958, now
makes it lawful for any person to solicit without a license
domestic employees for out-of-state employment.
Obtaining a Drug by Fraud
Act No. 909, South Carolina General Assembly, 1958, makes
it unlawful for any person to obtain any drug by fraud.
Penalty is set at a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars
or imprisonment of not more than eighteen months; subse-
quent offenses carry a fine not to exceed two thousand dol-
lars or imprisonment of not more than five years in the
discretion of the court.
Unlawful to Fire Certain Missiles without Permit
By Act No. 897, South Carolina General Assembly, 1958,
the Legislature has taken note of Sputniks, Thors, Vanguards,
etc. This act makes it unlawful to fire or discharge, without
permit, any missile within the borders of this State. A mis-
sile is defined as any object or substance hurtled through the
air by the use of gunpowder or any other explosive sub-
stance.
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